Foreign Aid and Domestic Taxation: Multiple Sources, One Conclusion by Clist, Paul
Working Paper 20
www.ictd.ac
Foreign Aid And Domestic Taxation: 
Multiple Sources, One Conclusion 
 
 
Paul Clist 
September 2014
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICTD Working Paper 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Aid And Domestic Taxation: 
Multiple Sources, One Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Paul Clist 
 
 
September 2014 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Aid and Domestic Taxation: Multiple Sources, One Conclusion 
Paul Clist 
ICTD Working Paper 20 
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in September 2014 
© Institute of Development Studies 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-78118-190-4 
 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may 
be made only under the following conditions: 
– with the prior permission of the publisher; or 
- with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK,  
 or from another national licensing agency; or 
- under the terms set out below. 
 
This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for 
resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other 
circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from 
the publisher and a fee may be payable. 
 
Available from: 
The International Centre for Tax and Development 
at the Institute of Development Studies,  
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261 Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202 
E-mail: info@ictd.ac.uk  
Web: www.ictd/en/publications 
 
 
3
Foreign Aid And Domestic Taxation: Multiple Sources, One Conclusion 
 
Paul Clist 
 
 
Summary 
 
There are genuine concerns that foreign aid may crowd out domestic tax revenue. In the 
short run this would have negative consequences for the recipient government's revenue, 
and over a longer period could corrode governance through breaking the social contract. In 
recent years, two papers have presented empirical results that suggest while aid loans are 
free from such concerns, aid grants do crowd out tax revenue. Previous research showed 
that the results from the first paper, Gupta et al. (2004), did not survive the inclusion of more 
recent data or a minimal lag on aid variables (a simple way of reducing concerns of 
endogeneity). This article deals with the second contribution, Benedek et al. (2012), and 
finds that the results cannot be replicated. Furthermore, they suffer from serious problems 
resulting from a dependent variable comprised of several incompatible data sources and 
definitions. A variety of econometric techniques are used, including new data, with the weight 
of evidence pointing to a modest but positive effect from foreign aid on domestic tax revenue. 
Fears over a negative effect for aid grants appear unwarranted, and are accounted for by the 
inappropriate use of data or endogeneity concerns.  
 
Keywords: development aid; tax; fiscal response; replication; MIMIC model. 
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Introduction 
 
The debate over whether, and in what circumstances, foreign aid displaces domestic tax 
revenue has a long history. The debate is clearly important: the immediate effect would be to 
reduce the effective value of aid flows, as they would not be additional resources for the 
recipient government but rather crowd out tax revenue. A recent quote from the House of 
Commons International Development Committee (2013: 4) illustrates the point well: ‘[w]e 
cannot expect the people in the UK to pay taxes to improve education and health in Pakistan 
if the Pakistan elite is not paying income tax’. An even greater fear relates to a potential 
pernicious effect of aid over a longer time horizon, where it could conceivably undermine 
governance through fracturing the social contract. Deaton (2013: 295) argues that ‘[o]ne of 
the strongest arguments against large aid flows is that they undermine these constraints, 
removing the need to raise money with consent and in the limit turning what should be 
beneficial political institutions into toxic ones’.  
 
This article focuses specifically on the link between aid and tax revenue, where it is argued 
that aid has different effects depending on whether it is given as grants or loans. Schmidt 
(1964) contains the majority of the theoretical reasons regarding whether there should be a 
differential effect from aid grants and loans, and since then the question has predominately 
been recognised as empirical. Gupta et al. (2004) entered the debate with a strong claim: aid 
grants depress domestic tax revenue but aid loans do not. The empirical basis for this claim 
was disputed by Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Carter (2010, 2013). The former extended 
the dataset and found that the negative relationship is not present if: a) the period 1985-2005 
is examined, or b) aid is included in specifications with a more reasonable lag. The latter 
found the results to be fragile to sample, and suggested that endogeneity may be driving the 
negative relationship between aid grants and tax revenue. Endogeneity is a concern, as the 
composition and volume of aid is not exogenous to factors such as per capita income or aid. 
Benedek et al. (2012) can be seen as a follow-up to Gupta et al. (2004), and responds to 
criticism with new methods and data but ultimately presents very similar findings.1 Here, I 
examine the evidence base for these claims, which influence important decisions about the 
correct composition of aid, and feed into the wider debate regarding the effect of aid on 
governance.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1 attempts, and fails, to replicate Benedek et al.’s 
(2012) results using the provided and described data. An advanced discussion of the 
suitability of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) techniques is found elsewhere (Carter 
2010, 2013) but the data is found to have more basic weaknesses. These weaknesses, 
stemming mainly from the use of multiple different sources, are explored in Section 2. A 
variety of solutions are examined in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
1  Replication attempt 
 
1.1 Replicating Benedek et al. (2012) 
 
I have attempted to replicate Benedek et al.’s (2012) results using the provided dependent 
variable and listed sources. There are several discrepancies. Limiting the sample to the 
countries in Appendix 1 of Benedek et al. (2012), there are six countries which are 
apparently included in the regression results but for whom no data exists for the dependent 
                                                     
1  Both are written by IMF-based researchers, and they share one author. 
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variable (four countries are not in the dataset, two exist but have no data). Clearly, both the 
provided dataset and the article cannot both be fully accurate, stymieing attempts to replicate 
the results. Comparisons between summary statistics in Benedek et al. (2012) and those 
from the reported sources reveal several other discrepancies. For example, the paper reports 
a mean value of 18.75 for trade openness, (exports+imports)/GDP, but a newly constructed 
dataset using the reported data sources gives a mean of 54.  
 
Table 1 Determinants of tax revenue 1980-2009 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
With source dummies: No Yes No Yes From Benedek et al. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Aid 0.005 0.006   -0.007*  
 (1.19) (1.49)   (0.004)  
Aid squared -0.000 -0.000   0.000  
 (-1.27) (-1.49)   (0.000)  
Loans   0.011** 0.010**  0.000 
   (2.33) (2.16)  (0.004) 
Loans squared   -0.000* -0.000  -0.000 
   (-1.72) (-1.64)  (0.000) 
Grants   0.003 0.005  -0.006* 
   (0.50) (0.82)  (0.003) 
Grants squared   -0.000 -0.000  0.000 
   (-1.03) (-1.28)  (0.000) 
Agriculture -0.006* -0.006 -0.007* -0.007* -0.008*** -0.003 
 (-1.67) (-1.63) (-1.89) (-1.88) (0.002) (0.003) 
Industry -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.19) (-1.29) (-0.64) (-0.76) (0.003) (0.000) 
GDP pc (Logged) 0.248** 0.230* 0.209 0.145 0.304*** 0.305*** 
 (2.09) (1.88) (1.62) (1.23) (0.122) (0.122) 
Trade openness 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** -0.002** -0.002 
 (2.90) (3.11) (2.30) (2.61) (0.000) (0.001) 
WEO Gen  -0.350  0.081   
  (-1.26)  (0.71)   
GFS 2001 Cen  .  0.155   
  .  (1.60)   
GFS 2001 Cen  -0.275  0.088   
  (-1.32)  (1.07)   
GFS 1986 Cen  -0.377*  .   
  (-1.71)  .   
GFS 2001 Bud  -0.561**  -0.192   
  (-2.27)  (-1.58)   
African R M  -0.265  0.183   
  (-0.88)  (1.28)   
Overall R squared 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.36 Not reported 
Between R squared 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.41 Not reported 
Observations 2174 2174 1968 1968 2589 2589 
Countries 99 99 97 97 118 118 
Note: The dependent variable is logged total tax revenue divided by GDP. Year dummies and a constant are included but not 
reported. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using country fixed effects, with clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * 
denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. The source dummies are relative to OECD central government data, where 
Cen stands for Central, Gen for General and Bud for Budgetary. ‘African R M' stands for African Revenue Mobilisation. GFS 
denotes the IMF Government Finance Statistics, and WEO the World Economic Outlook. 2001 and 1986 refer to different 
vintages of IMF data. Columns (5) and (6) are taken from Benedek et al. (2012: 13) Table 1, columns (1) and (4), where the 
estimator is also OLS with country fixed effects.  
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While an accurate replication has proved impossible, the regression results from the 
attempted replication are found in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1. For ease of reference, 
Benedek et al. (2012) results are reproduced in columns (5) and (6). These new results 
concur that tax revenue has a negative association with agriculture, and a positive 
association with income per capita. However, the coefficients reported in (1) and (3) differ in 
their sign on several key variables: Aid, Aid Squared, Industry and Trade Openness. The 
least important of these differences relates to industry: the coefficient is insignificant in all 
specifications. The coefficient for trade openness is positive in Table 1, but was found to be 
negative by Benedek et al. (2012). Despite apparently using the same sources, there seems 
to be quite a large difference in the two variables, as shown by comparing summary 
statistics. Logically, we would expect higher trade openness to mean higher tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP as import taxes are relatively easy to collect, and so the results here are 
more intuitively plausible. In later analysis I follow Clist and Morrissey (2011), who 
disaggregate ‘trade’ into imports and exports as they logically have different effects.  
 
1.2 A negative effect from aid? 
 
Turning to the coefficients of interest, there is a large disparity between the coefficients found 
using the new dataset and those reported by Benedek et al. (2012). They find that aid has a 
negative effect on tax revenue but has increasing returns. They find a similar pattern for aid 
grants, but a positive effect for loans with decreasing returns. By contrast, I find the pattern of 
a positive effect with diminishing returns for all types of aid: total, grants and loans. Benedek 
et al. (2012) conclude that aid (especially in the form of grants) has a negative association 
with tax revenue. They acknowledge but do not emphasise that their results imply that a 
higher level of grants actually has a positive effect on domestic tax revenue collection.  
 
The results here are more in line with expectation (at least regarding non-linearity): aid's 
positive effect on tax revenue diminishes as it becomes increasingly large relative to GDP. 
Table 2 reports the implied turning points, taken from Table 1. The turning point for total aid 
is calculated to be 65 per cent of GDP, meaning that aid can be said to have a negative 
effect on 0.3 per cent of the sample and a positive effect for the other 99.7 per cent. Grants 
are found to be more negative than loans when using this metric, but can still only be said to 
have a negative effect on domestic tax revenue in 1.8 per cent of the sample. 
 
Table 2 Turning points 
 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient  
squared 
Turning 
point 
Mean % of sample above 
turning point 
Aid/GDP 0.005 -0.00008 65% 8.2% 0.3% 
Loans/GDP 0.011 -0.0003 39% 2.6% 0.1% 
Grants/GDP 0.003 -0.0001 26% 5.6% 1.8% 
 
Note: Turning points are calculated using the coefficients in columns 1 and 3 in Table 1. The final two columns use the 
sample years and recipients.  
 
The results from these regressions do not support the conclusion that aid, in whatever form, 
is negatively associated with domestic tax revenue. It is not clear how the sample or data 
used here varies from Benedek et al. (2012), as I use their reported sources for independent 
variables and their provided dataset for the dependent variable, but the difference is 
meaningful. Perhaps the most important point to notice from the reported results is that the 
estimated coefficients for total aid and aid grants are not significant. Of the six relevant 
coefficients in columns (5) and (6) only two are significant, and only then at the 10 per cent 
level. Indeed, it appears that aid is a relatively small factor in tax revenue. This is consistent 
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with other results such as Gupta (2007); he focuses on determinants of tax revenue and 
finds aid has a small but significant positive effect.  
 
 
2  Multiple sources  
 
Clist and Morrissey (2011) reported a system break when extending the dataset of Gupta et 
al. (2004) from 1970-2000 to 1970-2005. This time effect implied that while Gupta et al. 
(2004) were right to report a negative relationship, this effect was only relevant in the period 
1970-1985, with a positive relationship being a better characterisation of the period 1986-
2005. Using the reported data sources I cannot replicate the weak negative association 
found by Benedek et al. (2012), nor the system break of Clist and Morrissey (2011), with the 
new data and time period. Regressions that augment the independent variables with an 
interaction term (where aid variables are multiplied by a dummy for post-1984) lack extra 
explanatory power as the augmented variables are insignificant, as shown in Table A1 in 
Appendix 1. A key element of the time trend may actually have been that using two different 
data sources as pre-1990 data (termed ‘historical’) was not comparable with post-1990 data,2 
but was treated as such. While there appears to be no systematic time trend effect in the 
data, there are several different sources used.  
 
While Benedek et al. (2012) treat the dependent variable as a single variable, they 
acknowledge that there are actually several sources. Each of these has their own data 
definition and methodology, and so the data is not strictly comparable. The largest difference 
between sources is perhaps that they explicitly measure different things: IMF GFS data 
measures tax revenue, while the World Economic Outlook data (the largest single source, 
Table 3) relates to all government revenue.3 The definition of the WEO variable implies that it 
includes aid, making it especially problematic. In addition, three different types of data are 
used: general, central and budgetary definitions are treated as the same. The difference in 
source is compounded by differences in coverage between datasets. The OECD data covers 
higher-income countries, and so the two samples overlap for only three countries: Chile, 
Mexico and Turkey. In the majority of cases, sources are inconsistent by recipient: on 
average countries are represented by about 1.8 sources over the 30-year period.  
 
Does the difference in sources matter? Columns (2) and (4) of Table 1 report the regression 
results from the two models proposed by Benedek et al. (2012) augmented by source 
dummies. There is clearly some effect of the source: the GFS 2001 central government 
figures appear to be relatively high, and GFS 2001 budgetary figures are relatively low. 
These are significant effects, with the latter coefficient much larger than the coefficient on aid 
loans, for example. However, this table does not represent a particularly elaborate test. If 
different sources were consistent in their differences, then the problem is easily rectified 
using source dummies, and the coefficients would be stable.  
 
Table 3 presents results from a more elaborate test, which allows the estimated relationship 
between independent variables and dependent variables to differ by source. If the 
relationship is robust and the source does not differ systematically we would expect stable 
parameter estimates. Of the seven sources, we might expect variation for those with few 
                                                     
2  The IMF (2001: 3-4) states that: ‘The methodology for compiling government finance statistics described in this [2001] 
manual differs substantially from the methodology of the 1986 GFS Manual’. 
3  Personal correspondence and the associated dataset state that OECD data was used, but the paper itself mentions only 
GFS data and consultation reports. It is not clear which was actually used given that even the cumulative total of 
sources does not reach the number of observations reported by Benedek et al. (2012). 
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observations or countries, but the results are quite different across the sources. Benedek et 
al. (2012) report that aid has a negative effect with increasing returns to scale. This pattern is 
only found when using GFS 2001 data; indeed the two largest datasets find opposite 
coefficient signs. Most variables are found to be significant in at least one regression or 
other, but this is not a sign of consistency. Trade Openness stands out as the only variable 
not to be found significant with both positive and negative signs. To summarise, Table 3 
shows that coefficient estimates are not robust to the various sources used, and questions 
the robustness of results in Benedek et al. (2012).  
 
Table 3 Estimating the effects on tax revenue by source, 1980-2009 
 
Source of the OECD WEO GFS 2001 GFS 2001 GFS 1986 GFS 2001 African 
dependent variable: Cen Gen Gen Cen Cen Bud R M 
Aid 0.095 0.001 -0.032** -0.007 0.009 -0.010 0.018* 
 (0.28) (0.30) (-3.71) (-1.65) (0.97) (-0.94) (2.69) 
Aid squared -0.012 -0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (-0.06) (-0.22) (3.11) (1.60) (-1.13) (0.97) (-2.71) 
Agriculture -0.038 -0.000 0.021* -0.004 -0.018* 0.007 -0.011** 
 (-3.19) (-0.11) (2.16) (-0.56) (-3.13) (1.04) (-2.92) 
Industry 0.010 0.001 -0.008 -0.010* -0.002 0.000 0.010* 
 (2.32) (0.19) (-1.40) (-2.41) (-0.43) (0.01) (2.56) 
GDP pc (Logged) -0.091 0.242* -0.922*** 0.228 0.087 0.631 0.320* 
 (-0.28) (2.65) (-7.68) (1.08) (0.39) (1.89) (2.28) 
Trade openness -0.006 0.003** 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003 
 (-0.74) (3.45) (1.87) (0.28) (0.49) (3.46) (1.22) 
Overall R squared 0.45 0.33 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.59 
Between R squared 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.57 
Observations 80 783 151 349 124 150 537 
Countries 3 55 19 32 11 24 31 
Note: The dependent variable is ‘government tax revenue’, though definitions vary. Year dummies are included, as are country 
fixed effects. In the source row, Cen stands for Central, Gen for General and Bud for Budgetary. ‘African R M’ stands for African 
Revenue Mobilisation. GFS 2001 and 1986 refer to two different vintages of the IMF GFS data, with substantial differences in 
data definitions. Other details as in Table 1.  
 
More elaborate techniques, such as GMM, would seem to compound the problem rather than 
solve it. For example, in the 2,458 cases where the same source is available for two 
consecutive years for a country, there is an average difference of 1.3 per cent in tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP. In the ninety-six cases where different sources are used for 
consecutive years, the mean difference is 4.9 per cent. Difference GMM estimations would 
see large random fluctuations that result from using different sources. These are not 
controlled for, and represent outliers that may erroneously drive the results. While Carter 
(2013) deals with many of the more technical aspects of empirical research in this area 
(concluding that there is little evidence of a negative effect from aid on tax), it appears there 
are much more fundamental problems with the data that are only compounded by the use of 
methods such as GMM.  
 
 
3  Four options 
 
Given the variety of dependent variables available there are four approaches: to treat the 
candidate dependent variables as interchangeable, to treat them completely separately, to 
model their relationship, or to use completely new data. In order to explore the validity of the 
first three options, I have constructed a new datset which includes all of the independent and 
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dependent variables described by Benedek et al. (2012) for 1980-2011 for their chosen 
sample, from the original sources.  
 
3.1 Option 1 Treat variables as interchangeable 
 
Benedek et al. (2012) treat the different variables as essentially interchangeable, and replace 
any missing observations from one dataset with those of any other. The benefit of this 
approach is that it minimises selection issues by maximising the sample size. However, it is 
potentially very problematic and at the very least introduces abnormally high measurement 
error. The preceding section showed that sample-specific dummies are significant when 
added to the main specification used in Benedek et al. (2012), and that running seven 
separate regressions leads to very different coefficient estimates for the variables of interest. 
A further complication that is noted here, but not explored further, is that the order in which 
missing data was replaced may have large effects. This may seem trivial, but with seven 
sources there are 5,040 possible orderings4, which is problematic unless the different 
sources are completely compatible.  
 
As a further test of whether the various sources are measuring the same thing, I use the 
newly-constructed dataset to investigate cases where more than one source exists for any 
given observation. If the variables are to be treated as interchangeable they must be more 
than correlated: two variables could be perfectly correlated if one is always double the other, 
but they would not be interchangeable. The requirement for treating the variables as 
exchangeable is that they must be consistent with each other. As such, I run twenty 
regressions of the form  
 
yi	ൌ	αij	൅	βijyj	൅	ε	
where yi		is a candidate dependent variable from source i, and yj	 is a candidate dependent 
variable from source j being used as an independent variable. The tests are F-tests of two 
assumptions, where the null hypotheses represent variables which could be substituted 
without introducing bias or noise.  
 
H0	:	αij		്	0	
	
H0	:	βij		്	1	
 
The results of these tests are displayed as p statistics in Table 4. Columns in Table 4 refer to 
the dependent variable (i.e. i) and rows to the independent variable (i.e. j). Of the forty 
comparisons shown, Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected in thirty-three cases 
at the 1 per cent level: the different sources do not measure the same thing in the same way.  
 
                                                     
4  This is due to 7!=5040 capturing all possible permutations. 
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Table 4 P statistics to test for agreement between sources 
 
  Budgetary GFS Central GFS General GFS WEO OECD 
Budgetary GFS Alpha  . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Beta . 0.14 0.91 0.75 0.00 
 N 1691 1018 497 1385 23 
       
Central GFS Alpha 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Beta 0.01 . 0.34 0.00 0.28 
 N 1018 1797 843 1161 52 
       
General GFS Alpha 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 
 Beta 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.01 
 N 497 843 868 676 27 
       
WEO Alpha 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.64 
 Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.52 
 N 1385 1161 676 3602 57 
       
OECD Alpha 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 
 Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 
 N 23 52 27 57 89 
Note: These regressions do not limit the sample to that of Benedek et al. (2012), and so may state a larger number of sources 
per observation with regard to their sample.  
 
The differences between sources have been shown in Section 2 to make a difference when 
there is only one source per observation. Table 4 reports tests regarding whether the various 
sources measure the same variable, and demonstrates very strongly that they do not meet 
simple tests of their agreement. In only one case do the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis: 
when the OECD variable is used as the dependent variable and the WEO variable is used as 
the independent variable. In the regression where those roles are reversed, the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  
 
3.2 Option 2 Different regressions 
 
The second option, if treating the various dependent variables as interchangeable is not 
sensible, is to treat all variables as completely independent. This avoids needlessly 
introducing noise into the regressions, though it does potentially introduce problems of 
sample selection bias that Benedek et al. (2012) avoid. The newly-created dataset means 
that the maximum number of sources for the maximum number of variables was created. 
Unlike the results in Table 3, any individual country can appear multiple times if the relevant 
data exists. I make three other changes to the preferred specification of Benedek et al. 
(2012). First, the specification introduces a one-year lag for aid variables. This is more 
realistic, as it is difficult to imagine aid having a contemporary effect on tax revenue. It also 
reduces fears of endogeneity (while not removing them), as tax shortfalls could easily lead to 
short-term contemporary increases in aid, such as in the case of a natural disaster. Second, I 
disaggregate trade into imports and exports, as they are likely to have different effects (see 
Clist and Morrissey 2011). Specifically, it is to be expected that imports increase tax revenue, 
as they provide a relatively easy avenue for tax collection. By contrast, exports are usually 
taxed less than domestic consumption, and so we would expect a negative coefficient given 
the opportunity cost of high exports includes foregone tax revenue. Third, I move away from 
estimating nonlinearities in the aid-tax relationship. Given data constraints and quality, it 
does not seem prudent to attempt to recover precise estimates of turning points. As can be 
seen from Table 2 estimates of turning points are very unstable, and so the preferred 
estimation is less ambitious.  
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Table 5 Preferred specification 1980-2011, by data source 
 
Source of dependent variable Budgetary GFS Central GFS General GFS WEO OECD 
Loans/GDP,  -0.000 0.004 -0.020*** -0.000 0.123 
Lagged (-0.06) (0.47) (-3.95) (-0.21) (1.07) 
Grants/GDP, 0.006* -0.005 0.006 0.004** -0.017 
Lagged (1.76) (-1.25) (0.75) (2.12) (-0.07) 
Agriculture -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009** -0.054* 
 (-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.35) (-2.52) (-3.28) 
Industry -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.014** 
 (-1.53) (-0.36) (0.03) (0.14) (6.04) 
Ln(GDP pc) 0.349 0.237 0.173 -0.134 -0.268 
 (1.57) (1.33) (0.89) (-1.26) (-0.89) 
Imports 0.008*** 0.004 0.003 0.004*** 0.000 
 (4.16) (1.48) (1.20) (3.17) (0.03) 
Exports -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.013 
 (-1.41) (-0.94) (-1.42) (1.34) (-2.76) 
Overall R squared 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.55 
Between R squared 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.40 
Observations 908 756 254 1540 77 
Countries 81 63 35 99 3 
Note: See Table 1 notes for details. Here, the dependent variable is given in the first row, using all available data from the 
reconstructed dataset. I do not include IMF data using the 1986 definition or data from the African Revenue Mobilisation dataset 
due to constraints on space/availability. Loans and Grants are both measured as a percentage of GDP, logged and lagged.  
 
What can be learnt from the results reported in Table 5? It is heartening that despite 
problems with the dependent variable, coefficients on the variables agriculture, industry, 
exports and imports tend to agree. The most consistent coefficient estimate is that for 
agriculture, which is always found to be negative. The last column, relating to the OECD 
source, has fewer observations and is the least similar to others. As in Clist and Morrissey 
(2011), the decision to split trade into imports and exports is justified by the coefficients on 
the two variables being of opposite signs. The signs are in line with theoretical predictions: 
imports are relatively easily to tax and exports lead to foregone domestic consumption, which 
would have been taxed. The log level of per capita income is insignificant in every 
regression.  
 
Turning to the variables of interest, aid grants and loans are significant in only three of a 
possible twelve cases. Both are found to be positive and negative in difference 
specifications. However, it is remarkable that in no specification is the coefficient on aid 
grants negative and significant. In fact, the only significant effects for aid variables are 
positive for grants and negative for loans.  
 
3.3 Option 3 MIMIC 
 
The third option represents a middle way between treating the different possible dependent 
variables as interchangeable and treating them separately. A multiple indicators multiple 
cause (MIMIC) model can be applied in this case. The model was introduced by Jöreskog 
and Goldberger (1975), and an example of its use can be found in Giles (1999). To describe 
briefly, the model states that there is an unobserved latent variable y* (tax revenue), but 
multiple indicators yi,…,ym are observed (the various candidates for the dependent variable). 
The MIMIC model then considers two sorts of relationships. For the relationship between the 
causes and the latent variable, an equation of the following form is estimated: 
 
y*	ൌ	a1x1,…,akxk	൅	ε       (1) 
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The relationship between the latent variable and the indicators is also modelled, using 
equations of the form: 
 
y1	ൌ	α1	൅	β1y*	൅	u1,	
…,         (2) 
ym	ൌ	αm൅	βmy*	൅	um	
 
These are then jointly estimated using maximum likelihood.5 Figure 1 is perhaps useful to 
visualise the model. The benefit of this approach should be seen predominately as a 
robustness check on the results presented in Table 5. The MIMIC model allows multiple 
candidate dependent variables to be used simultaneously, and can provide a larger sample 
than those using one candidate at a time.  
 
Figure 1 The MIMIC model 
 
 
One complication of using MIMIC models when there is not absolute overlap in sources is 
that it may be that models do not converge. Only one combination of sources works, and so 
Table 6 reports the coefficients from that regression. A further complication is that it is not 
feasible to use fixed effects in this case.  
 
Table 6 MIMIC Model, 1980-2011 
 
Equation (2)  Equations of the Form (1) 
Aid loans 0.002  Dependent variable: BA tax revenue (GFS) 
Lagged (0.40)  Latent variable 1.000 
Aid loans 0.029***   (constrained) 
Lagged (8.68)  Constant -3.028*** 
Agriculture -0.011***   (-15.71) 
 (-5.25)  R squared 0.22 
Industry 0.007***  Dependent variable: Revenue (WEO) 
 (4.19)  Latent variable 0.806*** 
Ln(GDP pc) 0.104***   (9.87) 
 (5.56)  Constant 2.205*** 
Imports 0.005***   (16.19) 
 (6.19)  R squared 0.81 
Exports 0.004***  Log likelihood 69426.71 
 (3.39)  Observations 3281 
R squared 0.47  Countries 114 
Note: In Equation (2) on the left panel, the dependent variable is the estimated latent variable. This is constrained in the first 
equation in the form (1), such that the coefficient on the slope of GFS tax revenue is equal to one. Thus the latent variable can 
be thought of as the underlying concept of tax revenue, with two indicators. Z statistics are shown below parameter estimated in 
parentheses. R squared is calculated on an equation basis, and refers to the equation above it. See Table 1 for other details.  
                                                     
5  In Stata, the relevant command is sem. All Stata code and data is freely available at 
<https://sites.google.com/site/paulclist/data>. 
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Bearing in mind the various caveats regarding the difficulty in model convergence, I present 
only one converged specification which uses two candidate dependent variables: GFS's 
Budgetary Tax Revenue and WEO's Revenue variables. Table 6 contains the full results for 
all equations. One estimated coefficient must be constrained in the model, and so ^	for the 
latent variable's effect on BA Tax Revenue is constrained to equal 1. The benefit of this 
approach is evident in the sample size, as the sample is much larger than those presented in 
Table 5. Dealing first with the equations of the form (1) on the right panel, we can see that 
both indicators are positively correlated with the latent variable. The WEO variable measures 
all government revenue, and so it is no surprise that the constants are such that WEO is five 
units (where the variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP, logged) higher. The 
coefficient on the latent variable in the WEO equation is less than one, meaning that revenue 
is estimated to be less affected by tax revenue than the GFS measure. Moving to the left 
panel, we see familiar and reassuring parameter estimates in most cases. For the variables 
of interest, we see that both types of aid are consistent with higher tax receipts in the 
following year, but the result is only significant (at the 1 per cent level) for aid grants. The 
control variables are almost all as expected and all significant: higher tax receipts are 
associated with less agriculture, more industry, being richer and importing more. The only 
variable which is not in line with expectations is that related to exports, where a positive 
effect is found.  
 
3.4 Option 4: New dataset 
 
A fourth option in attempting to replicate the results of Benedek et al. (2012) has recently 
become available due to the newly created International Centre for Tax and Development 
Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD). This new dataset is the culmination of a three-
year effort to provide a consistent and accurate estimate of tax revenue in developing 
countries. Crucially, there was an emphasis on compatible sources in the construction of this 
dataset to allow comparisons across countries and time periods. Table 7 provides the results 
of applying my preferred specification (used in Table 5) to the new data. This exercise 
provides several benefits. First, it provides a further test of previous research in this area, by 
using what appears to be the most accurate dataset available. In maintaining a comparable 
specification with minimal adjustments, the new data can be used to evaluate previous 
findings in this area. Second, as the new dataset is used to tackle new issues, it is useful to 
benchmark it using a familiar econometric specification on older datasets.  
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Table 7 ICTD dataset, 1980-2009 
 
 
 
Note: As for Table 1, but with the dependent variable from ICTD GRD. The aid variables are either concurrent, or lagged one or 
two years.  
 
Table 7 has the now familiar pattern for the majority of coefficients: tax revenue is positively 
associated with having higher imports, a smaller agriculture sector, lower exports and a 
smaller industrial sector. Of the six coefficients on the aid variables, only the coefficient for 
aid grants in column (1) is significant, with a negative sign. When a lag of one or two years is 
used, however, the coefficient for aid grants is both smaller and insignificant. This 
specification and data provide the only negative and significant effect of aid grants on 
domestic tax revenue I have found. However, a negative contemporary association is not 
necessarily evidence that aid grants cause lower domestic tax revenue. In any given year, a 
contemporary association is more likely to be the result of aid donors compensating 
recipients in adverse conditions (e.g. an economic downturn). If aid does corrode tax 
revenue, it is more likely to do so over a period of time, and yet the effect becomes 
insignificant over this time period.  
 
 
4  Discussion and conclusion 
 
Replication has long been recognised as performing a vital role in assessing the credibility of 
empirical results (see Camfield and Palmer-Jones (2013) for a recent review of the issues). 
For this reason I have attempted to replicate the results presented by Benedek et al. (2012), 
as it is the most high profile recent empirical research paper that reports differential effects 
from aid grants and loans on tax revenue. Like Carter (2013), I have failed to replicate the 
specific results. In only one case have I found a reported negative effect for aid grants: when 
contemporary aid grants are used. The specific replication failed even when using the exact 
dataset for the dependent variable reportedly used by Benedek et al. (2012). While Carter 
(2013) also provides an extensive critique of the methods used by Benedek et al. (2012) to 
combat endogeneity (mainly the use of GMM), I argue that there appear to be much more 
fundamental issues with the original data used. Specifically, several datasets are apparently 
used to construct a single dependent variable despite different data definitions. Tests show 
that previous specifications are not robust to the use of source dummies or running separate 
Aid variables: Concurrent Once lagged Twice lagged 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Loans/GDP,  0.002 0.004 0.002 
Lagged (0.76) (1.54) (0.59) 
Grants/GDP, -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 
Lagged (-1.78) (-0.76) (-0.49) 
Agriculture -0.007** -0.006** -0.005* 
 (-2.39) (-2.24) (-1.94) 
Industry -0.005* -0.005** -0.006** 
 (-1.84) (-1.99) (-2.25) 
Ln(GDP pc) 0.043 0.081 0.064 
 (0.52) (0.93) (0.75) 
Imports 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (5.40) (3.81) (3.82) 
Exports -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-1.91) (-1.69) (-1.77) 
Overall R squared 0.39 0.38 0.38 
Between R squared 0.41 0.42 0.42 
Observations 2173 2138 2102 
Countries 113 112 112 
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regressions by the dependent variable's source. Furthermore, the different candidate 
dependent variables are statistically and conceptually measuring different things. The use of 
system GMM in this setting is particularly worrying, as large yearly differences may simply be 
due to the use of different sources in consecutive years. The issue is wider than simply poor 
data quality: the empirical results are potentially misleading. For example, a substantial 
portion of the variable termed ‘tax revenue’ is provided by a variable which explicitly 
measures total government revenue. It is worrying that this misleading empirical result may 
influence policy, and underscores the value of replication.  
 
Given the data quality, it is heartening that the various empirical approaches employed here 
to deal with the issue of multiple candidate dependent variables point in a single direction: 
there is very little evidence that aid grants undermine domestic tax revenue. The only 
significant and negative coefficient relating to aid in Table 5 and Table 6 actually relates to 
aid loans. The only significant and negative coefficient for aid grants relates to 
contemporaneous aid, and is thus dogged by endogeneity concerns. The weight of the 
empirical evidence suggests that aid has a relatively small, possibly positive, influence on 
domestic tax revenue. There is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the composition of aid 
should be influenced by concerns relating to differential effects on tax revenue. Wider 
concerns relating to a longer-term corrosive effect on government cannot be dismissed on 
the basis of these results (even if aid leads to higher tax revenue, it may be that tax is a 
lower proportion of total government revenue than it would be without aid), but neither can it 
be used to support them.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 System break 
 
Table A1 provides evidence that, as suspected, there is no system break in the data 
provided by Benedek et al. (2012).  
 
Table A1 System break 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Aid 0.000  
 (0.03)  
*dummy 0.005  
 (0.64)  
Aid squared -0.000  
 (-0.28)  
*dummy -0.000  
 (-0.30)  
Loans  -0.018* 
  (1.73) 
*dummy  -0.009 
  (-0.80) 
Loans squared  -0.000** 
  (-2.10) 
*dummy  0.000 
  (0.99) 
Grants  -0.005 
  (-0.43) 
*dummy  0.010 
  (0.84) 
Grants squared  0.000 
  (0.06) 
*dummy  -0.000 
  (-0.74) 
Agriculture -0.006* -0.007* 
 (-1.80) (-1.95) 
Industry -0.007 -0.003 
 (-1.19) (-0.67) 
Ln(GDP pc) 0.251** 0.212 
 (2.12) (1.64) 
Trade openness 0.003*** 0.003** 
 (3.03) (2.38) 
Overall R squared 0.28 0.32 
Between R squared 0.28 0.39 
Observations 2174 1968 
Countries 99 97 
Note: ‘*dummy’ denotes the preceding variable multiplied by a dummy which takes the value 1 if the year is 1985 or later. For all 
other details, see Table 1. 
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Appendix 2 Data sources 
 
All data and Stata code can be accessed from <https://sites.google.com/site/paulclist/data>. 
 
Tax Revenue, Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Total tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Tax Revenue, Government Finance Statistics (GFS). Two vintages are used by Benedek et 
al. (2012): 1986 and 2001. These refer to two different data definitions. Furthermore, three 
types of variable are used: budgetary, central government or general government.  
 
Tax Revenue, World Economic Outlook (WEO) is in fact general government revenue 
(percentage of GDP). To quote from the data definition: ‘Revenue consists of taxes, social 
contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue. Revenue increases government's net 
worth, which is the difference between its assets and liabilities’ (IMF 2001, paragraph 4.20). 
 
Aid: Total, Grants and Loans. Net ODA, ODA grants, and ODA loans, relative to GDP, are 
from the OECD database.  
 
Agriculture and Industry. These are taken from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (WDI), and describe the added value as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Trade Openness, Exports and Imports. The numerator is taken from the IMF's International 
Finance Statistics (IFS) database. The denominator (GDP) is taken from the World Economic 
Outlook.  
 
GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database, and calculated in constant (2000) US dollars. 
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